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Introduction
One of the central questions in the ﬁeld of economics of uncertainty is the
inﬂuence of attitudes toward risk (i.e., the eﬀect of risk aversion) on opti-
mal decisions. Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) ﬁrst looked at this question
in the early 1960s, in the context of a portfolio problem. Since then, the
analysis of the behavior of risk-averse individuals facing risk has been set in
the context of Arrow-Pratt theory, most notably in the ﬁelds of insurance
and ﬁnance. The analysis has also been extended by Kihlstrom and Mirman
(1974) (henceforth, KM) to multidimensional utility functions in situations
in which the goods are not perfect substitutes (e.g., a dynamic environment).
In particular, KM shows that to generalize the Arrow-Pratt approach to the
multidimensional case, the issue of separating tastes from attitudes toward
risk must be dealt with. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of risk aversion on behavior
in the multidimensional case must take account of the problem of disentan-
gling tastes and attitudes toward risk. To achieve this, KM considers utility
functions that diﬀer by a concave transformation, and, thus, preserve ordinal
preferences over gambles.
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal decisions
using the KM approach.1 Speciﬁcally, we consider a general consumer’s
maximization problem under uncertainty subject to a budget constraint. In
the stochastic environment, there is a sure good and a risky good. The good
is risky due to the presence of randomness in the budget constraint. The
sure good is chosen before the realization of the random variable is observed.
The risky good is a residual, i.e., the risky good depends on the outcome of
the random parameter through the budget constraint. The set up is thus
a generalization of Arrow-Pratt’s portfolio model in which the goods are
perfect substitutes. We consider three cases of randomness: random income,
random price of the sure good, and random price of the risky good.2 In each
case, we study the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal decisions.
1See Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) for an analogous approach using diﬀerentiability.
2Note that the majority of the literature on risk aversion has been set in the context
of the static portfolio problem, which is equivalent to the price of the risky good being
random.
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We show that in the random income case as well as the case of the ran-
dom price of the sure good, the eﬀect of increasing risk aversion is to decrease
the amount of the normal sure good. While if the price of the risky good
is random, increasing risk aversion has an ambiguous eﬀect on the amount
of the sure good. These results follow from the fact that a more risk-averse
individual is not concerned by the riskiness of the risky good, but rather by
the riskiness of the utility gamble associated with the consumption bundle of
the sure and risky goods. This is merely an implication of the expected util-
ity maximization problem faced by the consumer. In fact, when the optimal
amount of the risky good increases, it decreases the riskiness of the utility
gamble faced by the individual. In other words, a concave transformation of
the utility function implies that the more risk-averse individual prefers gam-
bles whose corresponding utility gambles are less risky. This result pinpoints
the rationale of the consumer’s decisions not as a choice on the amount of
risky versus sure goods, but rather as a choice on a set of utility gambles
ordered in terms of their riskiness.3
Because the riskiness of the utility gambles yields the incentive for the
consumer to choose an optimal gamble, through the maximization of ex-
pected utility, the counterintuitive result originally observed by Ross (1981) is
achieved. Indeed, Ross (1981) provides an example showing that the Arrow-
Pratt deﬁnition of risk aversion fails to deliver the right “intuitive” results.
In particular, Ross (1981) writes that “in the portfolio problem, as wealth
rises individuals whose risk aversion declines in the Arrow-Pratt sense do
not necessarily increase their holding of riskier assets.” Convinced of the
intuitive idea that more risk aversion implies a smaller amount of the riskier
asset (or good), Ross (1981) introduces a stronger measure of risk aversion
that is necessary to accommodate the phenomenon observed when there are
several independent sources of risk, i.e., that the more risk-averse individual
actually chooses to consume more of the risky asset. In fact, in the example
provided by Ross (1981), the individual chooses more of the risky asset (or
good) because it reduces the riskiness of the utility gamble.
3Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) points out the relationship between increasing risk aver-
sion and preferences ordering over utility gambles.
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In our general approach to the consumer problem, we relate classical
demand theory to the theory of risk aversion. In particular, we show that
the inﬂuence of risk aversion can be separated into independent components,
i.e., income and substitution eﬀects, as in classical demand theory with the
outcome depending on their interplay. The interaction between the income
and substitution eﬀects as a determinant of the eﬀect of risk aversion on
optimal choice has also been noted in KM in the context of a consumer-
saving problem. KM shows that the eﬀect of changing risk aversion depends
on the rate of return on savings in the classical (certainty) case, that is, the
impact of the interplay between the income and substitution eﬀects. We
generalize the KM result by showing that in a two-dimensional setting the
implication of changing risk aversion depends on the source of randomness
as well as the inﬂuence of ordinal eﬀects, i.e., the income and substitution
eﬀects.
Our results on the eﬀect of changes in risk aversion are summarized in
three Propositions, which are inserted between relevant examples and ﬁgures
that illustrate the Propositions. Proposition 1 studies the case in which
income is random. Here, the implication of changes in risk aversion depends
on the normality of the sure good. When the sure good is normal, the optimal
decision of a more risk-averse individual is to consume more of the risky good,
which decreases the riskiness of the associated utility gamble. It is precisely
this case that contradicts the Ross intuition that a more risk-averse individual
prefers more of the sure (or riskless) good. In Proposition 2, we show that,
if the price of the normal sure good is random, a more risk-averse individual
chooses more of the risky good, since the income and substitution eﬀects pull
in the same direction. Here, the pure substitution eﬀect provides an incentive
to consume less of the sure good. In this case, the utility gambles become less
risky with more of the risky good, yielding an incentive for the consumer to
move in that direction. Proposition 3 shows that, if the price of the normal
risky good is random, as in the traditional portfolio problem, then the choice
of the normal sure good is ambiguous. In this case, there is an incentive
through the pure substitution eﬀect to increase the amount of the sure good,
i.e., increasing the sure good leads to a less risky utility gamble. Hence, the
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income and substitution eﬀects pull in opposite directions, and depending
on the relative strengths of these eﬀects, the individual is led to consume
more or less of the (normal) sure good. Note that Proposition 3 encompasses
the Arrow-Pratt result, namely the risky good decreases with an increase in
risk aversion, which is a special case and is due to the fact that, in the one-
dimensional case (i.e., perfect substitutes), there is no income eﬀect, which
implies that the utility gamble becomes less risky as the amount of the sure
good is increased. However, when there is an income eﬀect, this result holds
only when the substitution eﬀect is stronger than the income eﬀect.4
Finally, note that there is a related literature that studies the eﬀect of
riskiness (using second-degree stochastic dominance) on optimal behavior
originating with Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) and continuing with Kraus
(1979) and Katz (1981). These papers study the eﬀect of risk aversion on
optimal behavior as an intermediate step in studying the eﬀect of riskiness on
optimal behavior. Although generic in nature, the results of the eﬀect of risk
aversion are important in their own right and are used in this paper to prove
our results. Speciﬁcally, we use the results stated in Kraus (1979) and Katz
(1981) to determine the eﬀect of risk aversion for the consumer’s problem.5
While the eﬀect of risk aversion and the eﬀect of riskiness are distinct issues, it
is interesting to note that our results imply that for the consumer’s problem,
the income and substitution eﬀects also have an inﬂuence on the comparative
analysis for riskiness.
4In the three cases of randomness, an increase in risk aversion changes the weights
attached to the marginal utilities corresponding to diﬀerent outcomes of the uncertainty,
while the income and substitution eﬀects order the marginal utilities. For instance, with
a normal good and uncertainty in income, the marginal utility is increasing in income, so
that a lower income means a lower marginal utility and thus an increase in risk aversion
adds more weight to the marginal utilities associated with lower incomes.
5In particular, we use Lemma 2 in Kraus (1979) which is derived from Theorem 4
in Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) showing the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal behavior.
This lemma is used by Kraus (1979) as an intermediate step in determining the eﬀect of
riskiness of optimal behavior.
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1 The Eﬀect of Risk Aversion
In this section, we study the eﬀect of risk aversion on the optimal choice of
the consumption proﬁle (x, y˜) ∈ R2+ with utility function U(x, y˜), U1, U2 >
0, U11, U22 < 0. In the stochastic environment, x is the sure good, while y˜ is
the risky good due to the presence of randomness in the budget constraint.
Using the KM utility representation, the consumer’s maximization problem
under uncertainty is
max
x
WKM(x, y˜(x)) = max
x
Ey˜(x)vKM (U(x, y˜(x))) , (1)
where Ey˜(x) is the expectation operator over y˜(x), and vKM is a strictly
increasing and concave function, v′KM > 0, v
′′
KM ≤ 0. Note that the risky
good depends on x through the budget constraint, i.e., y(x) = (I −Pxx)/Py,
where I is income, and Px and Py are the prices of goods x and y, respectively.
The eﬀect of risk aversion is studied in three diﬀerent cases: random income,
random price for the sure good, and random price for the risky good.
1.1 Random Income
When income is random, (1) is rewritten as
max
x
EI˜vKM
(
U
(
x,
I˜ − Pxx
Py
))
, (2)
where EI˜ is the expectation operator for I˜. Proposition 1 states that the eﬀect
of risk aversion depends on the income eﬀect when only income is random.
The change in consumption due to a change in risk aversion does not result
from a change in income as in the usual income eﬀect. Instead Proposition 1
deals with the distribution of utilities associated with random income and
the eﬀect of that distribution of utilities on the choice of the consumption
bundle as the consumer becomes more risk-averse. In particular, when the
sure good is normal, a more risk-averse individual always consumes more of
the risky good.
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Proposition 1. Given (2), a more risk-averse individual
1. decreases the amount of a normal good x,
2. increases the amount of an inferior good x, and
3. does not change the amount of good x if there is no income eﬀect.
Proof. See the appendix.
This counter-intuitive result is explained by the fact that the individual
faces a utility gamble with each possible choice of the good x. The riskiness of
the utility gamble is implicit in the optimal trade-oﬀ between the sure good
and the risky good and is crucial to the choice of the individual, overshad-
owing the relevance of the riskiness of the good y˜. In fact, a more risk-averse
individual chooses a level of consumption that reduces the riskiness of the
utility levels associated with random income. To see this, we proceed in two
steps. We ﬁrst establish a relationship between the income eﬀect and the
types of utility gambles an individual faces. We then explain how optimal
behavior is changed when risk-aversion increases. To that end, it is conve-
nient to adopt a simple distribution for income, i.e., I˜ ∼ (π ◦ I, (1− π) ◦ I),
π ∈ [0, 1].
Income Eﬀect and Utility Gambles. The income eﬀect is key in
explaining how changes in x aﬀect the riskiness of the utility gambles. To
see this, let xI and xI be the optimal consumption for the sure good when
π = 1 and π = 0, respectively. For nondegenerate distributions of income,
x ∈ [min{xI , xI},max{xI , xI}] is the range of possible choices. We consider
two cases.
Suppose that the sure good is normal, i.e., xI < xI , and let MU(x, I) ≡
U1
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
−U2
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
Px
Py
be the marginal utility of consumption under
income I ∈ {I, I}. Then, for any choice of x, the marginal utility under low
income at the corresponding point of the lower budget constraint is smaller
than the marginal utility under high income at the corresponding point of
the upper budget constraint. Moreover, when the marginal utility under low
income is tangent to the corresponding budget constraint, (i.e., x = xI),
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Figure 1: Utility Gambles with Normal Good x
then the marginal utility under high income is strictly positive. Hence, for
x ∈ [xI , xI ], the diﬀerence between utility levels U
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
−U
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
is positive and strictly increasing in x ∈ [xI , xI ]. In other words, a decrease
in x brings the two utility levels closer together. In terms of gambles, this
means that a decrease in x results in a less risky utility gamble.
The relationship between x and the riskiness of the utility gamble is shown
in Figure 1 when the sure good is normal, i.e., xI < xI . The straight lines
represent the budget constraints under low income and high income, while the
convex lines are indiﬀerence curves. Note that the bundles (xI , yI(xI)) and
(xI , yI(xI)) are the optimal bundles under certain low income and certain
high income, respectively.6 When income is random, choosing x implies
6For I, I ′ ∈ {I, I}, let yI(xI′) ≡ (I − PxxI′)/Py.
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choosing the utility gamble
g(x) ≡
(
π ◦ U
(
x,
I − Pxx
Py
)
, (1− π) ◦ U
(
x,
I − Pxx
Py
))
(3)
for x ∈ [xI , xI ]. From Figure 1, the choice xI has a utility gamble corre-
sponding to the solid circles, while the choice xI has a utility gamble cor-
responding to the empty circles. Hence, the gamble g(xI) is less risky than
the gamble g(xI). In general, as shown in Figure 1 this implies that, for
x, x′ ∈ [xI , xI ], x < x′,
U
(
x′,
I − Pxx′
Py
)
< U
(
x,
I − Pxx
Py
)
< U
(
x,
I − Pxx
Py
)
< U
(
x′,
I − Pxx′
Py
)
.
(4)
Suppose next that the sure good is inferior, i.e., xI > xI , so that the
marginal utility under high income is smaller than the marginal utility under
low income at the corresponding point on the budget constraint. For x ∈
[xI , xI ], the diﬀerence between utility levels U
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
− U
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
is
positive and strictly decreasing in x ∈ [xI , xI ]. In other words, an increase
in x brings the two utility levels closer together. In terms of gambles, this
means that an increase in x results in a less risky utility gamble, as depicted
in Figure 2, where the utility gamble associated with x∗ is less risky than
the utility gamble corresponding to x. In general, this implies that, for
x, x′ ∈ [xI , xI ], x < x′,
U
(
x,
I − Pxx
Py
)
< U
(
x′,
I − Pxx′
Py
)
< U
(
x′,
I − Pxx′
Py
)
< U
(
x,
I − Pxx
Py
)
.
(5)
Optimal Utility Gamble. Having shown that the income eﬀect deter-
mines the direction of a reduction in the riskiness of a gamble, we next turn
to the optimal behavior. Without loss of generality, we deﬁne two diﬀerent
KM utility representations, W 1KM(x, y˜(x)) = U (x, y˜(x)) andW
2
KM(x, y˜(x)) =
ϕ (U (x, y˜(x))), ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ < 0, so that W 2KM is strictly more risk-averse than
W 1KM .
Recall that MU(x, I) ≡ U1
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
−U2
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
Px
Py
is the marginal
9
Figure 2: Utility Gambles with Inferior Good x
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utility of consumption for I ∈ {I, I}. Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions corre-
sponding to preferences W 1KM and W
2
KM are
πMU(x, I) + (1− π)MU(x, I) = 0, (6)
and
πρ(x, I, ϕ′)MU(x, I) + (1− π)ρ(x, I, ϕ′)MU(x, I) = 0, (7)
respectively. Here,
ρ (x, I, ϕ′) =
ϕ′
(
U
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
))
ϕ′
(
U
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
))
+ ϕ′
(
U
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)) , (8)
is a weighting function that depends on the risk aversion of the individual,
ρ(x, I, ϕ′) = 1 − ρ(x, I, ϕ′) ∈ [0, 1]. Note that risk-aversion measured by
the function ϕ enters the ﬁrst-order condition only through the weighting
function ρ. Remark 1 states the eﬀect of risk aversion on the weighting
function.
Remark 1. When income is random, the more risk-averse individual adds
more weight to the low value of income, i.e., ρ(x, I, ϕ′) > 1/2.
Given Remark 1, the eﬀect of risk aversion is determined by the income
eﬀect, which orders the marginal utilities.
Remark 2. When the sure good is normal, MU(x, I) < MU(x, I), while an
inferior sure good yields MU(x, I) > MU(x, I).
Combining Remarks 1 and 2 implies that a more risk-averse individual
puts more weight on the lower marginal utility, which corresponds to the low
income when the sure good is normal and the high income when the sure
good is inferior.7 Hence, a more risk-averse agent decreases the amount of
the sure good if and only if it is normal.
It is worth noting that before imposing the more risk-averse transforma-
tion ϕ, expected utility maximization yields a trade-oﬀ between the sure good
7This is a simpliﬁed version of the general proof of Kraus-Katz as used in the appendix.
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Figure 3: Optimal Utility Gamble with Normal Good x
and the risky good. However, the introduction of ϕ changes that trade-oﬀ by
giving the more risk-averse individual an incentive to choose a less risky util-
ity gamble. In the random income case, this is done by reducing the amount
of the good x. From this vantage point, it appears that the cardinality of the
utility function determines the consumer’s choice. However, it is clear from
Figure 1, that, for any normal good x, it is ordinal preferences that dictate
a decrease in the amount of the good x, which results in a less risky utility
gamble.
Figure 3 further illustrates the eﬀect of risk aversion on optimal behavior
when preferences are Cobb-Douglas, i.e., U(x, y) = xαy1−α, α ∈ (0, 1).8 Here,
the sure good x is normal. The solid lines represent the utility functions,
while the dotted decreasing lines represent the marginal utility functions.
The points x1 and x2 are the optimal bundles corresponding to preferences
W 1KM and W
2
KM , respectively. From Figure 3, an increase in risk-aversion
8To generate the graph, we set Px = Py = 1 and I ∈ {2, 5}.
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adds more weight to the marginal utility under low income, which decreases
the amount of the sure good, i.e., x1 > x2, so as to reduce the riskiness of
the utility gamble, i.e., u1 < u2 < u2 < u1.
1.2 Random Prices
Having shown that the eﬀect of risk aversion depends on the income eﬀect
when income is random, we next study the cases of random prices. Here, the
relative strength of the income and substitution eﬀects determine the eﬀect
of risk aversion on the optimal choice of x.
Random Price of the Sure Good. When the price of the sure good
is random, (1) is rewritten as
max
x
EP˜x
vKM
(
U
(
x,
I − P˜xx
Py
))
, (9)
where EP˜x is the expectation operator for P˜x. Proposition 2 states that
the eﬀect of risk aversion is determined by the interplay of the income and
substitution eﬀects.
Proposition 2. Given (9), a more risk-averse individual
1. decreases the amount of a normal good x, and
2. increases the amount of an inferior good x if and only if the income
eﬀect is stronger than the substitution eﬀect.
Proof. See the appendix.
To explain the results in Proposition 2, it is convenient to adopt a simple
distribution for the price of the sure good, i.e., P˜x ∼
(
π ◦ P x, (1− π) ◦ P x
)
,
π ∈ [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we deﬁne two diﬀerent KM utility repre-
sentations, W 1KM(x, y˜(x)) = U (x, y˜(x)) and W
2
KM(x, y˜(x)) = ϕ (U (x, y˜(x))),
ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ < 0, so that W 2KM is strictly more risk-averse than W
1
KM .
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Letting MU(x, Px) ≡ U1
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
− U2
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)
Px
Py
be the marginal
utility of consumption for Px ∈ {P x, P x}, the ﬁrst-order conditions corre-
sponding to preferences W 1KM and W
2
KM are
πMU(x, P x) + (1− π)MU(x, P x) = 0, (10)
and
πρ(x, P x, ϕ
′)MU(x, P x) + (1− π)ρ(x, P x, ϕ′)MU(x, P x) = 0, (11)
respectively. Here,
ρ (x, P x, ϕ
′) =
ϕ′
(
U
(
x,
I−Pxx
Py
))
ϕ′
(
U
(
x,
I−Pxx
Py
))
+ ϕ′
(
U
(
x, I−Pxx
Py
)) , (12)
is a weighting function that depends on the risk aversion of the individual,
ρ(x, P x, ϕ
′) = 1 − ρ(x, P x, ϕ′) ∈ [0, 1]. Note that risk-aversion measured by
the function ϕ enters the ﬁrst-order condition only through the weighting
function ρ, as in the case of random income. Remark 3 states the eﬀect of
risk-aversion on the weighting function when Px is random.
Remark 3. When the price of the sure good is random, the more risk-averse
individual adds less weight to the low value of Px, i.e., ρ(x, P x, ϕ
′) < 1/2.
The eﬀect of risk aversion is determined by the income and substitution
eﬀects, which orders the marginal utilities. Consider the sign of the derivative
of MU(x, Px) with respect to Px is useful in ordering the marginal utilities,
i.e.,
∂MU(x, Px)
∂Px
= −
(
U12 − U22Px
Py
)
x
Py︸ ︷︷ ︸
=IEPx
−U2
Py︸︷︷︸
=SEPx
. (13)
Here, IEPx and SEPx , both negative, are proportional to and of the same
sign as the income eﬀect and the substitution eﬀect, respectively.
Remark 4. When the sure good is normal, both the income and substitution
eﬀects are negative, so that MU(x, P x) > MU(x, P x). When the sure good is
14
Figure 4: Utility Gambles with Normal Good x and Random Px
inferior, i.e., IEPx > 0, the relative strengths of the income and substitution
eﬀects determine the ordering of the marginal utilities. For instance, if the
(positive) income eﬀect is stronger than the (negative) substitution eﬀect,
then, from (13), MU(x, P x) < MU(x, P x).
Remarks 3 and 4 explain the result in Proposition 2. In particular, when
the sure good is normal, a more risk-averse individual puts less weight on
the marginal utility corresponding to the high price of x. Proposition 2 is
illustrated in Figure 4 for the case of a normal good x. Due to the random-
ness of Px, the slope of the budget constraint makes the utility gamble less
risky as consumption decreases. Speciﬁcally, when Px is random, the pure
substitution eﬀect induces a less risky utility gamble in the direction of less
quantity of the sure good, from x to x∗, which increases the amount of the
risky good y.
15
Figure 5: Utility Gambles with Normal Good x and Random Py
Random Price of the Risky Good. When the price of the risky good
is random, (1) is rewritten as
max
x
EP˜y
vKM
(
U
(
x,
I − Pxx
P˜y˜
))
, (14)
where EP˜y is the expectation operator for P˜y. Proposition 3 states that the
eﬀect of risk aversion is again determined by the interplay of the income and
substitution eﬀects.
Proposition 3. Given (14), a more risk-averse individual
1. decreases the amount of a normal good x if and only if the income eﬀect
is stronger than the substitution eﬀect, and
2. increases the amount of an inferior good x.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows that, when the price
of the risky good is random, the substitution eﬀect induces a less risky utility
gamble by increasing the amount of the sure good from x to x∗.
1.3 Examples
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 establish the connection between risk aversion and
classical demand theory implicit in KM, and explain, in that context, the
limits of the intuition of the Ross (1981) critique on risk aversion. In partic-
ular, increasing the amount of the risky good when risk aversion increases, is
natural and not counterintuitive, as thought by Ross (1981) and his followers.
We now illustrate our results by considering speciﬁc classes of preferences:
Cobb-Douglas, Leontief, and quasi-linear utility functions.
Suppose that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, i.e., U(x, y) = xαyβ, α, β >
0, so that x is a normal good. Note that the results in Propositions 1, 2, and 3
continue to hold, even when the utility function is concave or convex, as long
as there is an interior solution to the constrained optimization problem. For
random income, more risk aversion has the eﬀect of decreasing the amount
of x. This result is even stronger when the price of x is random, since
the income and the substitution eﬀects go in the same direction. However,
when the price of y is random, the income and the substitution eﬀects not
only go in opposite directions, but cancel each other out with Cobb-Douglas
preferences. This is exactly the consumption-saving problem discussed in
KM, in which the rate of return (the price of y) is random.
Suppose next that preferences are Leontief, i.e., U(x, y) = u (min{x, y}),
u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, so that x is a normal good. Then, there is no substitution
eﬀect and the income eﬀect determines the direction of the change along
with an increase in risk aversion. In particular, regardless of the source of
risk, an increase in risk aversion always decreases the amount of the sure
good in favor of the risky good. To see this, consider the income distribution
I˜ ∼ (1 − π ◦ I, π ◦ I), I < I. Moreover, assume that Px = Py = 1. Since
the optimal solution lies in I/2 ≤ x ≤ I/2, the individual’s maximization
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problem is9
max
x
EI˜u
(
min
{
x, I˜ − x
})
= πu (x) + (1− π) u (I − x) . (15)
The ﬁrst-order condition is πu′(x)− (1− π)u′(I − x) = 0 so that
u′(x)
u′(I − x) =
1− π
π
. (16)
Consider next a more risk-averse individual, i.e., the more risk-averse indi-
vidual’s maximization problem is
max
x
πϕ(u(x)) + (1− π)ϕ(u(I − x)), (17)
ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ < 0. The ﬁrst-order condition is πϕ′(u(x∗))u′(x∗)−(1−π)ϕ′(u(I−
x∗))u′(I − x∗) = 0 so that
u′(x∗)
u′(I − x∗) =
1− π
π
ϕ′(u(I − x∗))
ϕ′(u(x∗))
. (18)
Since ϕ is strictly concave and I/2 ≤ x∗ ≤ I/2, it follows that
ϕ′(u(I − x∗))
ϕ′(u(x∗))
> 1. (19)
Hence, from (16), (18), and (19),
u′(x∗)
u′(I − x∗) =
1− π
π
ϕ′(u(I − x∗))
ϕ′(u(x∗))
>
u′(x)
u′(I − x) (20)
which implies that u′(x∗) > u′(x) or x∗ < x as shown in Figure 6.
The more risk-averse individual consumes even more of the risky good
9If x < I/2, then the outcome is strictly worse than choosing x = I/2, while, if x > I/2,
then the outcome is strictly worse than choosing x = I/2. In this case, the optimal solution
has both x and y positive, i.e., there is no corner solution in which either x = 0 or y = 0.
However, on the interval I/2 ≤ x ≤ I/2, there can be corner solutions, when x = I/2
or x = I/2, which correspond to the most risk-averse and the most risk-loving choices
respectively.
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Figure 6: Leontief Preferences
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due to the presence of only income eﬀects.10 This decrease in the amount
of the sure good x yields a less risky utility gamble as depicted in Figure 6.
Note that, with Leontief preferences, the amount of x always decreases be-
cause there is only a pure income eﬀect, i.e., without substitution. That is
why Leontief preferences yield results opposite to the Arrow-Pratt’s portfolio
problem, in which there is no income eﬀect and only substitution eﬀect.
Suppose ﬁnally that preferences are quasi-linear, where x is a normal
good. These preferences shed light on the Arrow-Pratt result, i.e., an increase
in risk aversion increases the amount of income invested in the safe asset (i.e.,
allocated to the sure good in our context). We now demonstrate that the
Arrow-Pratt result holds due to the absence of the income eﬀect, and that the
source of uncertainty lies in the rate of return of the risky asset. Speciﬁcally,
we consider two cases and show stark diﬀerence in results between the two.
First, consider the case in which there is no income eﬀect for the sure good x,
i.e., U(x, y) = u1(x)+y, u
′
1 > 0, u
′′
1 < 0. When income is random, since there
is no income eﬀect, risk aversion has no eﬀect on the amount of x. When
the price of x is random, increased risk aversion causes the amount of x to
decrease solely due to the substitution eﬀect. However, for a random price
of the risky good, the substitution eﬀect dominates (since there is no income
eﬀect), which implies that the amount of x increases along with an increase in
risk aversion. This result generalizes the result in the Arrow-Pratt portfolio
problem. In fact, it is only in this case that increasing risk aversion increases
the amount of the sure good without reference to income and substitution
eﬀects. However, the result is not robust to a slight modiﬁcation in the
utility function. To see this, consider the quasi-linear utility function, i.e.,
U(x, y) = x + u2(y), u
′
2 > 0, u
′′
2 < 0. In this case, the sure good x is normal,
so that if either income or the price of x is random, risk aversion decreases
the amount of the sure good x. On the other hand, for random price of the
risky good, the income and substitution eﬀects pull in opposite directions.
If the income eﬀect is dominant, then an increase in risk aversion leads to a
10Note that if the initial choice is x = I/2, then the consumer is making the most
risk-averse choice. Therefore a more risk-averse transformation cannot reduce the level of
x.
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decrease in the amount of the sure good x. This last result illustrates that
the Arrow-Pratt result is solely due to the absence of an income eﬀect on
x. Finally, note that another version of the Arrow-Pratt theorem is that, if
income increases, then an individual with decreasing risk aversion reduces
the amount of the sure good. This result is not general and is due only to
the fact that, in the portfolio problem, there is no income eﬀect for the sure
good.
2 Final Remarks
In this paper, we completely characterize the relationship between changes
in risk aversion and classical demand theory in the case of a single source of
uncertainty. We show that a more risk-averse consumer generally decreases
the amount placed in the sure good. In addition, we show that it is the util-
ity gambles that determine the choice of a more risk-averse agent between
the sure good and the risky good. This provides an explanation for certain
paradoxical behaviors of an individual who becomes more risk-averse. The
paper also paves a path for some immediate interesting questions. In partic-
ular, one could ask what the relationship between risk aversion and classical
demand theory implies for changes in income in which the consumer is de-
creasingly risk-averse. This is especially interesting in light of Arrow-Pratt’s
result that in the portfolio case increasing income results in an increase in
the risky asset if and only if the consumer is decreasingly risk-averse with
income.
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A Proofs
We combine the proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3. We ﬁrst state the following
Lemma which combines Lemma 2 in Kraus (1979) and conditions stated
in Katz (1981).
Kraus-Katz Lemma. Let x∗
θ˜
= argmaxx Eθ˜ϕ(Z(x, θ˜)) such that
∂2ϕ(Z(x, θ))/∂x2|x=x∗
θ˜
< 0. If ∂Z(x, θ)/∂θ|x=x∗
θ˜
> 0 and ∂2Z(x, θ)/∂x∂θ|x=x∗
θ˜
<
0 (> 0), then x∗
θ˜
increases (decreases) along with an increase in risk aversion.
Alternatively, if ∂Z(x, θ)/∂θ|x=x∗
θ˜
< 0 and ∂2Z(x, θ)/∂x∂θ|x=x∗
θ˜
> 0 (< 0),
then x∗
θ˜
increases (decreases) along with an increase in risk aversion.
In the consumer’s problem, Z(x, θ) ≡ U (x, (I − Pxx)/Py) , θ ∈ {I, Px, Py}.
Suppose ﬁrst that income is random as in Proposition 1, i.e., θ˜ ≡ I˜. Then,
∂U(x,(I−Pxx)/Py)
∂I
> 0, and ∂
2U(x,(I−Pxx)/Py)
∂x∂I
= IEI ≡ U12 · xPy −U22 · PxxP 2y is of the
same sign as the income eﬀect related to a change in income. By Kraus-Katz
Lemma, x∗
I˜
decreases along with an increase in risk aversion when the sure
good is normal, i.e., IEI |x=x∗
I˜
> 0. Suppose next that the price of the sure
good is random as in Proposition 2, i.e., θ˜ ≡ P˜x. Then, ∂U(x,(I−Pxx)/Py)∂Px < 0,
and ∂
2U(x,(I−Pxx)/Py)
∂x∂Px
= IEPx + SEPx , where IEPx ≡ −
[
U12 · xPy − U22 · PxxP 2y
]
and SEPx ≡ −U2Py < 0 are of the same sign as the income and substitution
eﬀects, respectively, related to a change in the price of the sure good. By
Kraus-Katz Lemma, x∗
P˜x
decreases along with an increase in risk aversion
when the sure good is normal, i.e., IEPx |x=x∗
P˜x
< 0. The eﬀect of risk aver-
sion for an inferior sure good depends on the relative strength of the income
and substitution eﬀects. Suppose ﬁnally that the price of the risky good is
random as in Proposition 3, i.e., θ˜ ≡ P˜y. Then, ∂U(x,(I−Pxx)/Py)∂Py < 0, and
∂2U(x,(I−Pxx)/Py)
∂x∂Py
= IEPy + SEPy where IEPy ≡ −
[
U12 · xPy − U22 · PxPy
]
I−Pxx
P 2y
and SEPy ≡ U2PxP 2y > 0 are of the same sign as the income and substitution
eﬀects, respectively, related to a change in the price of the risky good. By
Kraus-Katz Lemma, x∗
P˜y
increases along with an increase in risk aversion
when the good is inferior, i.e., IEPy |x=x∗
P˜y
< 0. The eﬀect of risk aversion
for a normal sure good depends on the relative strength of the income and
substitution eﬀects.
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